On January 27, 2025, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order categorically barring transgender Americans from continuing to serve or enlisting in the U.S. military. Even though thousands of transgender service members have been serving in the military honorably, and in many cases with distinction, for the past four years, the Trump Administration states that this sudden reversal is necessary because allowing transgender people to continue serving or enlisting in the future would undermine the military’s readiness and cohesion. Several transgender service members and potential enlistees challenged the Order in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On February 14, 2025, CAC filed an amicus brief in support of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Our brief makes two principal points.  

First, the Constitution guarantees equal protection for all. Because of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection within the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has long recognized that courts have a constitutional obligation to ensure that government does not disadvantage a class of people simply out of animosity. To effectuate that guarantee, the Constitution requires policies that single out a class of people for disparate treatment to have—at the very least—a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. And classifications that discriminate based on sex require heightened judicial scrutiny. 

Second, the government’s ban on military service by transgender Americans cannot withstand any level of judicial scrutiny. President Trump states that transgender service members cannot meet the “high standards for troop readiness, lethality, cohesion, honesty, humility, uniformity, and integrity.” But these are the very same justifications that have been cited, time and again, by enemies of greater integration of our military—and they are the same concerns that, time and again, have proven to be rooted in unsupported stereotypes and misplaced fears.  

When the military was racially segregated, proponents of that policy claimed it was necessary for unit cohesion and military effectiveness; when gay and lesbian people were prohibited from serving openly, proponents of that policy claimed it was necessary for unit cohesion and military effectiveness; and when women were forbidden from serving in combat roles, proponents of that policy claimed it was necessary for unit cohesion and military effectiveness. Yet the military is now racially integrated, gay men and lesbians serve openly, and women are allowed in combat roles—and there have been no negative effects on unit cohesion or military effectiveness. To the contrary, military experts agree that ending those discriminatory policies and ensuring diversity in the military’s ranks actually strengthened the military. Concerns about unit cohesion and military effectiveness did not justify treating some classes of military service members in a discriminatory manner then, and they do not do so now.  

For the past four years, thousands of transgender people like Plaintiffs have served openly and with distinction at the highest levels of the military. They have met every strict physical and mental health requirement the military has imposed on them. And they have done so with overwhelming support from their units. Their experience confirms what the military has been saying for years: allowing transgender people to serve openly will not have any negative effect on the military’s performance, readiness, or cohesion. The Constitution does not permit this sort of unsupported discrimination.  

On March 11, 2025, CAC filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs’ renewed application for preliminary injunction.