Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Despite these broad protections from employment discrimination, the Wake County Board of Education reassigned Wanza Cole from her position as a school principal to a position in the school district’s central office because she is Black.  Cole challenged that transfer, arguing that an employment reassignment because of race violates Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision.  The district court granted summary judgment for the school board, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school board’s actions did not violate Title VII because Cole did not establish that her reassignment constituted an “adverse employment action” that had a “significant detrimental effect.”  Cole filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to review that decision.  CAC filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Court to grant the petition and reverse the ruling of the Fourth Circuit.

Our brief argued that Title VII prohibits an employer from racially “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” regardless of whether that disparate treatment produces adverse effects.  We argued that the original public meaning of Title VII’s plain text prohibits an employer from transferring an employee because of race, as such a transfer necessarily alters an employee’s “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” even if her compensation and other monetary benefits remain the same.

Next, our brief argued that the court below imposed requirements on Title VII plaintiffs that have no basis in the relevant statutory text.  The Fourth Circuit held that a Title VII plaintiff alleging discrimination must show that she suffered an “adverse employment action” that had a “significant detrimental effect.”  But no such requirements exist in Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision, and requiring a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to show adverse effects is contrary to Congress’s plan in passing Title VII and the statute’s history.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, Congress passed Title VII to eliminate discrimination in employment and to ensure that employees are not treated differently solely because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  And the historical record makes clear that the Congress that passed Title VII understood that it would prohibit discriminatory job transfers.

In June 2021, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.  The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the case means that many Title VII plaintiffs will continue to bear the burden of establishing that they suffered “significant detrimental effects” from an employer’s discrimination, even though Title VII itself requires no such showing.